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Attack on flotilla: A strategic blunder by Israel
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Ajish P Joy
03 June 2010
Israel’s intervention in the high-seas of the Mediterranean to block a Gaza-bound flotilla was a tactical as well as strategic blunder. The incident comes close on the heels of the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh allegedly carried about by Mossad in Dubai and Israel’s refusal to allow Noam Chomsky from entering West Bank, incidents that invited widespread global disapproval and marred Israel’s image considerably.
The flotilla of six ships was organised by Insani Yardim Vakfi, a Turkish humanitarian organisation (Israel alleges that it has terrorist links) and the Free Gaza Movement, an international group working for the removal of the Gaza blockade. Israel had imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip since Hamas gained control of the disputed territory in 2007 and had warned that the mission to Gaza was a challenge to its sovereignty. The flotilla was carrying relief materials to Gaza and had close to 700 activists, 600 of them Turkish citizens. Incidentally Turkey, Israel’s closest ally in the Middle East, played a key role, arranging men and material for the endeavour.
When the flotilla, set off from Cyprus on May 30, neared Gaza, the Israeli authorities asked it to change its course to the Israeli port of Ashdod. The authorities promised that the relief materials could be transferred to Gaza after inspections. This offer was turned down and at about 64 kilometres off the Israeli coast, when the ships were in international waters, naval commandos from the elite Shayetet 13 unit were air dropped into the vessels. While the insertion was uneventful in the case of the first five ships, it took a violent turn on the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara.
According to the Israeli version, backed by videos, the commandos were attacked by those onboard with batons, metal poles and clubs and they retaliated in self-defence. The activists denied this allegation and accused the Israeli soldiers of firing without any provocation. Some Israeli reports suggest that a few activists managed to snatch firearms from the commandos which were then used to fire at them. This is not the way the “best trained commando force in the world” reacts to a situation of which it had sufficient prior warning and had the time and resources to do detailed profiling and reconnaissance. The Israeli intelligence failed in estimating the number of activists on the ship, their preparedness, motivation and the possible modus operandi. The Israeli political leadership responsible for this tragedy, dubbed by Haaretz as “seven idiots in the cabinet”, must take the ultimate responsibility for such gross mismanagement.
Israel chose the worst possible option. It could have taken a political decision of allowing the ships into Gaza and then subject the contents of the ships to a foolproof inspection. It would have been probably the best option and would have enabled Israel to project a positive image as well. The reasons suggested by Israeli officials against this move -- that there may be rockets or ammunitions in the ships or that permitting the ships to dock in Gaza would have set a bad precedent -- is questionable.
Even if the Israelis wanted to stop the flotilla, there were better ways of achieving this aim. They could have sabotaged and immobilized the ships without a violent intervention, or could have physically blocked the path of the ships. Still, if they wanted to board the ships, they should have done it after day break, when the ships were no longer in international waters. They should also have permitted media to be present instead of enforcing a news blackout. Ironically, this did not prevent live Twitter updates, Facebook postings or Al Jazeera coverage from the ship while there was no response from the Israeli establishment. The official video from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) went on air only after nine hours, severely limiting its effectiveness and utility.
On the strategic level, the fallout from the flotilla takeover means that Israel will find it increasingly difficult to maintain and justify the Gaza blockade. The event has also caused further deterioration in Israel’s ties with Turkey, one of its key allies. Turkey has recalled its Ambassador from Israel, calling the event an act of state terrorism. Global reactions to the event show that Israel has been isolated with hardly any diplomatic support coming in to defend its actions.
As more aid ships plan to sail to Gaza in future, Israel is likely to find itself in an unenviable position. It will have to answer the Gaza question as well as take a hard look at its Palestinian policy at the earliest in order to ensure its own future, security and stability.
Ajish P Joy is an Associate Fellow with Observer Research Foundation
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