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A 'Mandate' for Maoists?
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N Sathiya Moorthy
25 May 2010
The way Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has been reduced to going public for a ‘mandate’ to handle the Maoist menace, violating what some Congress party colleagues too may concede as the ‘collective responsibility’ of the Cabinet, it is becoming increasingly clear that the issue has acquired political proportions – having crossed the limits of administrative concerns. The very fact that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was called upon to defend his Home Minister at his anniversary media meet at the conclusion of UPA-II’s first year in office would go equally long way to prove the point. In doing so, the Prime Minister was not defending politics of the ‘Spectrum variety’ but policies that are of great import to the unity and integrity of the nation as such, for years and decades to come – independent of which party is in power or who is in office.
That the Government was ill-equipped to handle the emerging situation on the Maoist front became clear even when the ‘Telangana agitation’ broke out in Andhra Pradesh, almost overnight. It had been known all along that the Osmania University campus had been the hot-bed of Left militant groups for long. This however seemed to have escaped the notice of the intelligence agencies, both of the Centre and of the State Government. The follow-up failures on the Naxal front in neighbouring States may have nothing to do with the Telangana-centric agitation in Andhra Pradesh but it did reflect the inadequacy of the governmental agencies.
In a way, the ‘Telangana agitation’ was also a precursor to the way the Centre addressed political issues of the kind. Possibly barring the birth of the Indian State ‘stroke of the midnight hour’, Telangana was the only State to be born at night when the very same Home Minister announced it after the rest of the nation had gone to sleep one night – to find that a new one had been created, almost overnight. What followed the announcement need not be recalled just only after months. Earlier, for political reasons or otherwise, the Centre looked the other way when the Trinamul Congress let the ‘Sangur issue take the centre-stage, not just in native West Bengal but on the national stage’. There were then allegations that the Naxalites were exploiting the situation, and had the blessings of more legitimate political parties at the local-level.
Of course, Sangur was a different kettle, and happened when Chidambaram was not the Home Minister. Does it imply that the malaise, if any, runs deeper and has also run longer? After all, as Prime Minister Singh recalled at his media meet, it is almost three years since he designated Maoist violence as the most serious of all internal security threats to the nation in the coming years. That was long before Dandewada I & II. Much blood, particularly of the security forces personnel – those symbols of the Indian State – have flowed since. If there are internal calls from within the ruling party and possibly the Government since, for curtailing the powers of this Home Minister in the handling of the Maoist problem, the seed might have been sworn thus on the Telangana front. Even otherwise, sections of political opinion seem to have concluded that the Home Minister has been hogging headlines where it could have been left to parent ministries and their respective ministers.
No one can question Chidambaram’s qualification as a top-notch Supreme Court lawyer to argue the nation’s case on the 26/11 blasts case with and for the Pakistani authorities. However, it is the kind of job that has traditionally rested with the External Affairs Ministry. The latter has had handled such communication often through less obtrusive official channels than media-hogging ministerial presentations. Maybe, the decision in this matter was not that of Chidambaram. If so, the Government at higher levels may have to have a re-look on issues of the kind.
Enough Notice, but No Clear Answers
From being desi Naxalites to adapting an international jargon like Maoists, Leftist militants have come a long way in the ‘reforms era’. Independent of the reforms-linked evolution of Maoist militancy, there was enough evidence that the Naxalites had grand plans to expand their area of operation as far back as the early Nineties, if not even earlier. The ‘Dandakaranya Plan’, as had been known to the Governments in the country and their respective security and intelligence agencies, had laid it all bare long ago.
A two-day international conference, organised by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) at Chennai in January 2005, clearly indicated that leftist militants in the country were working already on creating a North-South corridor, and had plans similarly for an East-West corridor. Speakers at the conference pointed out how Governments, both at the Centre and in the States concerned, was doing precious little to contain and curb their growth and expansion other than having periodic meetings and making pious statements. The Maoists had passed that stage long ago. There were no clear answers to questions at the conference on how much money the Naxals possessed, where they had been stacked, how they were being used – or where these groups, or dalams, had moved after lying low, or being rendered ineffective in native Andhra Pradesh.
The creation of new States like Jharkhand in particular left militant cadres of protagonist outfits from the past nearly a century with neither hope, nor satisfaction on having achieved something for their communities. Their frustrated youth became the readymade cadre for exploitative Maoist recruiters and instructors. If the Chennai conference incidentally cited the carrot-and-stick policy successfully adopted by Andhra Pradesh to contain Naxalism over the years, other States seemed to have any inclination to take a leaf out and adapt it to their own conditions and circumstances. Nor did the Centre seem to have taken any initiative in the matter.
Confusion, Defeatism
In a way, what Chidambaram has to offer by way of containing the Maoist menace, or his party colleagues and critics alike have to say in the matter only reflect the sense of utter confusion and defeatism, at the national-level. Together, they are seeking to lock the stable after the horses have bolted. It is thus that you have the Home Minister one day warning the Maoists to lay down arms, or face the consequences. On another day, you have him appealing to their leadership to fax their willingness to his office. Through a media statement and in all seriousness, the Minister even left a Delhi fax number for them to contact him. From confusion, it came down to providing comic relief, thus reflecting a sense of defeatism.
It may be a good idea for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to have a serious review of the Government’s strategy on the handling of the Maoists, Naxalites, or whoever they are. Years ago at a Chennai seminar, future-day National Security Advisor (NSA), M K Narayanan, had cautioned his audience about the possibility of leftist militancy finding a fresh and expanded foothold in the country – and possibly establishing linkages with overseas left movements from other continents, too. That was when Brajesh Mishra was National Security Advisor for then Prime Minister Vajpayee.
Nothing seemed to have been done then, northing seemed to have been done, later. It would thus be worthwhile for Prime Minister Singh to find out as to what measures Narayanan as his NSA had initiated in this regard while in office – and what results that they had produced. If the finding is that the NSA should rather be confined to security issues, and not nuclear negotiations, then this Prime Minister would have done some good to himself, his Government and his nation.
The same could well be said about the functioning of the Home Ministry and Home Minister, who seems wanting ‘sky high powers’, and literally so, for shooting at the Maoists from the air. If adequate intelligence was available on the ground, it is one’s belief that the security forces could handle the situation better from the ground than from air. At least, ‘collateral damage’ could be minimised, if not avoided – particularly after New Delhi had taken a political position on the non-use of air power by other nations in the region in handling insurgencies on their territory.
Talks, With Whom and for What?
Independent of internal changes that the Government may – or, may not have – to effect, Governments at all levels need to be clear about what the Maoists want and how their demands could be met, if at all. Those in the know would acknowledge readily that the Maoist militants across the country do not take instructions, or obey a single entity, leave alone any individual, as many other insurgent/militant groups in the country may have done. True, they have an apex body, but they do not have a binding leadership. They are as dispersed as village Panchayats in the country. Neither talking to one group, nor extinguishing another’s leadership would put an end to the menace.
Nor would ushering in high-speed development change the pace of militancy at this late stage. As their very existential approaches go, insurgency groups the world over detest State-sponsored developmental activities in the areas under their control. For development of infrastructure like roads and waterways, electricity and telecommunication, to them, would mean easy access for the security forces to nab them. It would also ultimately mean that the writ of the State would run in those parts, and the local population would, even if by default, derive the benefits of State-sponsored development, in terms of education and healthcare, employment and family incomes. It is thus that insurgents often target symbols of the State and development, like police stations and post offices, railway trains and Government officials. To them, it is much more than creating panic, or setting of ‘catastrophic terrorism’ of a kind. It is part of their ideology, methodology, et al.
Independent of an identifiable leadership and identifiable methodology, there lies the question of identifiable issues for which the Government can negotiate with the Maoists. Barring individual issues and cases, which often may pertain to the arrest /release of an individual or two, and talking about ending harassment and exploitation of local population that they claim to serve and defend, there is little that Maoist groups have identified as larger issues over which the Government at the Centre, or in the State should and could negotiate with them. Insurgent groups in the North-East, or even terrorist-groups in Jammu and Kashmir, and earlier in Punjab, have had specific political issues, like a separate nation or power-sharing and devolution of some kind. Constitutionally-mandated governments in the country thus had specific issues with a special focus for negotiating with those insurgent groups. It is totally absent in the case of the Maoists.
Need for National Consensus
There is no knowing now if the Maoists have spread their wings already across the country, and if so, to thickly-populated urban centres, as well. There seems to be no evidence to show that they are working in tandem with other insurgent/terrorist groups from within the country or outside. There is also nothing to prove otherwise. In the past, there had been indications that the Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh had linkages with the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and may have served as a conduit with the ULFA in Assam. Today, Maoists have a strong presence in many States and many more districts all across the country. Where their presence is not felt, there is still no knowing if they are not there.
Already, there are apprehensions that the war on Maoist militancy may be long drawn out than the Governments at the Centre and in the States are ready to acknowledge. It could also become more complex as months and years pass by. Considering the political differences between the administrative leadership at the Centre and in many States, it is imperative that there is need for greater cohesiveness in the political responses that they give to Maoist threats and actions. It was in the absence of such a cohesive approach that separatist terrorism in Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir took the ugly turn that they took – and also got the longevity that they enjoyed.
Given that law and order is a hall-mark of good governance in the eyes of the voter, prolonged but unproductive engagement with the Maoist militancy, politically or otherwise, has the potential to convert it into an ‘anti-incumbency factor’ against ruling parties at election-time. If it thus heralded a change of political leadership, there is a greater need than is acknowledged on a national policy that successive governments can and should implement. The results may be long in coming, but that is also the only way they can be achieved.
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